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Asian Journal of Management Cases
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The online version of this article can be found at:
DOI: 10.1177/097282011000800104
Asian Journal of Management Cases
R. Srinivasan
CavinKare Private Limited (A) : The Entrepreneurial Innovation
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AVINKARE PRIVATE LIMITED (A):
T
HE ENTREPRENEURIAL INNOVATION
R. Srinivasan
Case A on CavinKare describes the entrepreneurial journey of the founder,
C.K. Ranganathan. As the enterprise outperformed expectations, the organization
set itself an incredible vision. This case traces the history of the entrepreneur and
the growth story of the enterprise. The case describes the context of opportunity
recognition and exploitation, and elucidates the signifi cant decisions taken by the
entrepreneur and the organization in order to sustain rapid growth amidst liberalization
and stiff competition from multinational companies with deep pockets and
signifi cant stakes in the industry.
Keywords:
CavinKare, C.K. Ranganathan, rapid growth, entrepreneurship,
innovation
At the beginning of the fi scal year 2007–08, C.K. Ranganathan (CKR), Chairman and
Managing Director of CavinKare Pvt. Ltd, had just completed a review meeting with
his top management team (called the core team). CKR returned to his corporate
offi ce in Chennai and jotted down some points to ponder over on his drive back
home. At the top of the list was how to deal with the recent resignation of one of
his earliest associates. The future prospects of the company looked very bright, yet
what concerned him at that point was how to manage the exit of a senior colleague.
As one of the founding members of the team, the employee had made an immense
contribution, yet was now clearly out of his depth, unable to cope with the newly
introduced distributed manufacturing model that included a company-owned manufacturing
facility in Uttarakhand in North India, apart from the third-party units in
Pondicherry, in South India.
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S
AGE PUBLICATIONS LOS ANGELES/LONDON/NEW DELHI/SINGAPORE/WASHINGTON DC
DOI:
10.1177/097282011000800104
This case was prepared by R. Srinivasan, Associate Professor of Corporate Strategy & Policy,
Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore, to serve as a basis for class discussion rather than
to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. The author
would like to thank C.K. Ranganathan and the senior management of CavinKare for their
support in documenting this case.
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As far as CKR was concerned, there was no dilemma—the employee had contributed
signifi cantly to the growth of the enterprise for the past twenty years and he had
been a valued member of the team. Yet, as the organization aspired to reach new
heights, it was equally important to keep growing professionally. Any gaps in performance
were simply unacceptable. It was, thus, a critical moment in the history of
CavinKare—calling into question the core values of the organization and specifi cally
the sensitive issue of loyalty versus performance. CKR believed that his acceptance
of the resignation had conveyed its own message, but his core team was asking for an
explicit communication that would address the unspoken questions in the minds of
CavinKare employees, inevitable whenever a senior employee left an organization.
How should he respond?
For CKR, it was a time to refl ect on his entrepreneurial journey: where it had all
started, the twists and turns along the way, and where he now headed.
F
AMILY BACKGROUND AND CKR’S EARLY YEARS
C.K. Ranganathan (CKR, aged 46 years in August 2007) was born in Cuddalore, a coastal
town in South India. His parents were teachers; in fact, all his forefathers were by
profession either educationists or employed in the government service. CKR had fi ve
siblings, all of whom acquired professional qualifi cations and subsequently established
themselves in their respective careers. The odd one out was CKR himself, who was a
low-performing student and had to eventually drop out of an English-medium school
to one that used Tamil (his mother tongue) as the medium of instruction. From here
he completed his schooling, assisted by private tutors. His father considered him as
being ‘weak in studies’, a good-for-nothing boy, useful only for farming.
CKR’s father quit his teaching job to set up a pharmaceutical repacking business,
based on the premise that ‘whatever a rich man enjoys, a poor man should also
enjoy’. The pharmaceutical repacking business enabled expensive medical products
to be availed by poor people who preferred small single-use packs (from the usual
100-g packs to 5-g packs). The small single-use packs, though no different in terms
of unit price, provided daily and weekly wagers access to pharmaceutical products,
which they could not afford otherwise. This early exposure to the utility of the singleuse
pack was thus embedded in CKR’s mind, and proved to be a cornerstone of his
business strategy later.
In his youth, CKR was a free spirit and would rather play with friends and pets
than study. He acquired a chip on his shoulder, a sense of being an underdog as he
watched his other siblings do well in their studies, and later, in their professions. Still,
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he managed to complete his education and graduated from Annamalai University,
specializing in Chemistry, hoping to join his father’s pharmaceutical repacking business
as a chemist.
His father extended his experience in repacking to hair care—packing shampoos
in small sachets. The initial technology used for sachet making was primitive but
adequate. The demand for small packs grew, and there was no special need for any
marketing. The shampoo product was branded ‘Velvette’ and was distributed directly
to the retail outlets. Other products that were packed in sachets included honey and
coconut hair oil.
I
NITIATION INTO THE FAMILY BUSINESS
CKR’s father died of a heart attack at the age of 48. This untimely death was a shock
to the family and several adjustments had to be made. His brothers, though still in
college, stepped in to run the family business. Heavily in debt, the brothers quickly
exited from pharmaceuticals and other products and began focusing on the shampoo
business. They began advertising, and soon the brand came to be recognized in the
small area in which it was distributed.
On completing college in 1982, CKR entered the family business as the head of
manufacturing. Within days, there was a crisis. CKR was distinctly uncomfortable
with the way the business was being operated. He found the work environment at
the plant to be negative—the workers were ineffi cient and productivity was very low.
He took charge of the situation and suspended a few of the workers to set an example.
As productivity improved, his brothers realized that CKR was indeed competent and
encouraged him. CKR gained confi dence, overcame some of his complexes and started
believing in himself.
T
HE BEGINNINGS OF CAVINKARE ENTERPRISE
To be sure, CKR’s working methods were disruptive and soon there were serious
differences within the family. CKR saw his brothers taking decisions on emotional
rather than rational grounds, contrary to his own principles. There came a breaking
point and one day CKR decided to walk out of his house, with his savings of
`15,000,
without staking claim to his share of the family property/business.
To avoid any confl ict with his family, he did not want to be in the same business.
However, with no alternative in front of him, he decided to enter the shampoo
business—it was the only thing he knew, and he was confi dent that he could do better.
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Secondly, the market was fi lled with a lot of imitations, and consumers were not very
brand loyal. A typical consumer would walk into a retail outlet and ask for a ‘packetshampoo’,
leaving the brand choice to the retailer. Very few customers recognized
brands and still fewer were brand loyal. CKR saw a huge opportunity in this highgrowth
business and independently entered the market in 1983 with the Chik brand
of shampoos, named after his father—Chinni Krishnan.
To ensure that he did not compete with his brothers’ Velvette brand, he introduced
Chik shampoo in 10-ml sachets at a retail price of 90 p,
1 whereas Velvette and other
brands were selling 7-ml sachets at 70 p each. The market reaction was poor, and CKR
quickly reverted to the market standard of 7-ml sachets at 70 p each.
CKR’s friends joined his business and stayed with him. He involved all his friends
in the business in some capacity or the other. They were a source of moral support
to him and helped him through the initial diffi cult days. Social networking sustained
him in the early days, but later as the enterprise evolved, fraternal ties could also
become a liability.
CKR, T
HE ENTREPRENEUR: DEVELOPING CAPABILITIES
CKR had a burning desire to succeed. He had challenged his brothers and there was
a strong ‘need to prove’. His very survival was at stake. He quickly realized that he
needed to change—he had to learn a lot about the business; he needed to acquire technical
knowledge and more importantly, he had to learn to communicate with people.
To improve his communication, especially in English, he needed a lot of practice.
He told himself repeatedly that it was a matter of both ‘I have to’ as well as ‘I can
do’ it. He stopped reading Tamil newspapers and began subscribing to the English
newspaper,
The Hindu. He also started reading business publications to understand
concepts of business and enterprise as well as to draw inspiration from the success
stories documented.
His business ambitions went beyond the state of Tamil Nadu. He began writing in
English, and meeting/recruiting/working with people who did not speak Tamil. He also
realized that business required a lot of mental mathematics—ability to see patterns in
numbers and make quick inferences. He trained himself in making presentations and
working with numbers. He realized the need for quick inferences when he was faced
with frequent analysis of the impact of changes in formulations on the gross margins
1
90 p = 0.90 Indian Rupees, where p refers to paisa, equivalent to 1/100 of a rupee.
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of the company. He began estimating the inherent trade-offs of improving quality
and rising costs. He trained his mind to handle a series of Monte Carlo simulations,
which he realized was a critical competence as a businessman.
As an entrepreneur, he barely knew the difference between sales and marketing. He
used to think that effi cient distribution was marketing. When his brothers, who were
managing Velvette shampoo, outsourced their distribution to Godrej Industries (one of
India’s leading national marketing/distributing companies), CKR decided to do the
opposite. Whereas outsourcing distribution would have largely enhanced the scope,
he preferred to have control and ownership of the product concept within his team.
He decided against a multi-product/multi-brand distributor system, where he realized
the organizational motivation would be restricted to the commissions earned from the
brand, rather than the ownership and commitment that would be built in an in-house
distribution system. He also realized that distribution outsourcing would make him
just a manufacturer and therefore, he would have no opportunity to interact with his
channel partners/end consumers. Feedback on product and consumer contributed
to valuable market knowledge; the decision to undertake direct distribution allowed
management control, building operational fl exibility and the capacity for innovation
and together these were to prove key factors for success in the marketplace.
P
RODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND INNOVATION
One of the fi rst product innovations of the company was a jasmine-fragrance shampoo,
a direct application of consumer insight. Traditionally, South Indian women were in
the habit of using fresh jasmine fl owers to adorn their hair and quickly accepted this
shampoo variant. This differentiation was a big selling point at the retail level and
the company also advertised this through commercials.
Soon, sales improved (to about
`50,000 per month) and the company broke even.
As an entrepreneur, it was a great feeling not to have to struggle to pay the vendors
on time, pay salaries and still manage to retain some surplus for personal expenses.
But this happy phase did not last long. Sales began to drop and the company defaulted
on vendor payments and employees’ salaries.
This was a wake-up call for CKR and he immediately went to the root of the problem.
He toured with his salesmen to the retail stores to observe the selling process. He
noted that when the retailer was busy with a customer, he would not attend to the
salesmen and would make them wait. Quite a few of the salesmen would interpret
this as lack of courtesy and disinterest towards the brand/company he represented.
However, through repeat visits, CKR realized that it was only when the retailer was
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actually interested in either placing an order or providing any feedback, would he
ask the salesman to wait. Often, the feedback was harsh and rustic retailers had a
callous manner while speaking. The salesmen were then provided training to handle
feedback from retailers—in whatever language it came. CKR realized the importance
of building the brand through effective sales techniques and trained the salesmen
accordingly.
Another thing that CKR and his team learned during their fi eld visits was that
Velvette had become a generic name for shampoos in sachets (known popularly as
packet shampoo). When a customer asked for either Velvette or packet shampoo, it
was the retailer who decided the brand, depending on his understanding/reading of
the customer (if she is likely to be brand loyal or not). This understanding gave them
a critical insight on the effect of retailer push on the margins of a particular brand.
They decided to increase the retailer margins. As opposed to Velvette’s practice of
giving one sachet free per dozen (at the rate of
`8 for a dozen sachets against an MRP
of
`9 for a dozen sachets, giving the retailers margins of `1 per sachet + one sachet
free), they decided to give two sachets free per dozen. However, they quickly realized
that other competitors were supplying to the retailers at
`4 per dozen. Most of these
brands had begun diluting their shampoos with water to maintain margins. CKR took
a very strong call at that point to mandate that they would not compromise on their
quality to retain margins. This was a very signifi cant decision at a moment when
Chik was struggling to establish a brand name among a plethora of imitators and the
category leader, Velvette.
As CKR realized that the retailer push basically worked for low quality products, the
only option left was to build the brand and generate consumer pull. The company then
came up with a unique offer—a customer would get one Chik shampoo sachet free if
they returned fi ve empty shampoo sachets. This innovative sales promotion scheme
fi rst caught the attention of retailers—the retailer would get one sachet free for every
three consumers who took this offer, and the wholesaler would get one sachet free
for every six consumers who took this offer. The offer was printed on the back of the
sachet; a great deal of promotion was done using hand bills and notices. Initial fears
that rag pickers who could pick up empty sachets from the roadside and riverside
and encash the offer were misplaced. Many consumers came back, thanks to the
active support of the retailers. Several new retailers wanted to include Chik in their
stock—for example, a retailer who had never stocked Chik, produced a huge stock of
empty sachets and called on the Chik salesman to place the order. This scheme was a
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AVINKARE PRIVATE LIMITED (A) 35
milestone in brand-building efforts and ensured that Chik was now available at 90 per
cent of the targeted outlets (up from only 20 per cent outlets) before the scheme. Sales
went up from a dwindling
`35,000 per month to `900,000 per month in a period of
almost 10 months. As they slowly phased out the scheme, the brand-building efforts
were intensifi ed on the radio with punch lines like ‘graduate from asking for packet
shampoo to Chik shampoo’. The brand was differentiated further by the introduction
of rose in addition to jasmine fragrance and the sales doubled from about
`900,000
per month to about
`25,000,000 per month. Since then, there was no looking back.
T
HE ENTERPRISE ORGANIZING PHILOSOPHY
The company was built on three major principles—competent employees, rather
than loyal employees; payments to vendors and other debtors on time, even though
the borrowing was based on high rates of interest, and associating with committed
distributors, even if their prior experience was negligible.
CavinKare began as an entrepreneurial organization with the support of friends. Yet,
as time went on, CKR thought it was prudent to place more value on competence rather
than loyalty. As he upgraded his competence levels, he pushed his friends–employees
to keep raising the bar. This meant that CKR as a businessman had to make some
tough calls regarding friends who were also his colleagues—either part with them at
the appropriate time, or fi nd them a suitable slot.
Building a professional organization meant it was necessary to have really strong
systems and processes in place. Investments in computing were made in 1984, inducting
a systems analyst to support accounting and fi nance.
In the early days, the company used to pay salaries between the fi fth and fi fteenth
of the next month. CKR realized that paying salaries on time had a direct impact on
employees’ morale and moved the disbursement of salaries to the end of the current
month—he would even borrow money to pay the salaries if required. Similarly, he
borrowed money at market rates (sometimes as high as 48–54 per cent per annum)
to pay the vendor dues. This signaled commitment and professionalism to both employees
and business associates and loyalty grew to the organization (and not to CKR
the person).
Another major commitment was the hiring of wholesalers (redistribution stockists
or RS). As a small company, it was diffi cult to hire RS to distribute their products.
Chik volumes were very small compared to other product lines that the major RS distributed.
CavinKare decided that their qualifi cation requirements were quite modest
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and hired a lot of small businessmen who had the money to invest (
`2,000 advance
or a bank guarantee) and manpower to sell (2 salesmen, sometimes including the
entrepreneur). The RS salesmen were initially supported by the company salesmen
and the business grew. For the RS who had so far managed a small nondescript
business, the shift to FMCG distribution indicated upward mobility and an upgrade
in social status. In addition, the commitment demonstrated by the company in fulfi
lling promises gave further confi dence and a battery of loyal distributors joined
hands to take on the market. As the distributors were convinced about the product
and its differentiation from other products, they requested advertising support on the
fragrance factor. The company obliged with a front-page quarter advertisement in a
leading Tamil newspaper heralding the ‘fragrance revolution’ that was sweeping the
region. This innovative advertising campaign was another landmark and contributed
to the growth in the sales and image of the company.
The decision to outsource manufacturing was yet another strategic move. By that
time, CKR had learnt that the value creation of the enterprise came from distribution
and marketing, and not through manufacturing. As the turnover increased, expanding
manufacturing capacity would require more capital investment. Instead, CKR initially
convinced a friend to invest
`40,000 in a manufacturing facility with a promise that
the returns would start fl owing within four months. This pledge was indeed kept;
encouraged by the prospects, the company partnered with a series of third-party manufacturing
units (TPUs). This also helped their cash fl ows, as they were selling to their
RS in cash but buying from the manufacturing units on credit. With this arrangement,
both the RS and the manufacturers were making suffi cient margins (relative to their
investments and commitments) as well as the company.
Right from the beginning, the company was prompt in paying sales tax and income
tax, which improved its image with bankers. In the mid-1980s, getting bank fi nance
was extremely diffi cult, so the fact that the company was paying income tax was
viewed positively. A bank manager extended fi nance to the company, waiving the
requirement of a
`25,000 collateral, as payment of income tax was assumed as the
ability to service the loan.
As the Indian government phased out tax concessions that were given to domestic
small-scale industries, many CavinKare competitors faded away, unable to pay taxes or
compete with the multinationals. CavinKare continued to thrive and grew vigorously,
as they had the cash fl ow, brand image and expansion plans to remain competitive.
The company expanded aggressively across regions, hired more professionals and
doubled their manufacturing capacity (with the help of third-party units).
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AVINKARE PRIVATE LIMITED (A) 37
C
AVINKARE PRIVATE LIMITED (CAVINKARE) TODAY
The company had crossed the annual turnover of
`5,000 million in the year 2006–07.
Its all-India network of 1,300 stockists catered to over 2.5 million retail outlets.
It had also registered its footprint in neighbouring international markets like Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, Nepal, Indonesia and Malaysia.
The company was organized into three strategic business units (SBUs)—Personal
Care, Foods and International Business. The divisions operated on diversifi ed product
portfolios pertaining to hair care (shampoos, hair wash powders, hair oils, hair dyes);
skin care (fairness creams, moisturizing lotions, face washes, cold creams, face toners,
deodorants, talcum powders); home care (toilet cleaners, dish wash bars) and foods
(pickles, masalas, ready to cook, candy, dates). The company also diversifi ed into
services through its retail beauty salons under a wholly owned subsidiary, Trends in
Vogue Pvt. Ltd.
T
HE CAVINKARE ORGANIZATION
The CavinKare organization was headed by CKR, designated as the Chairman and
Managing Director (CMD). As the organization diversifi ed into multiple businesses,
it was managed as an SBU-based structure in 2005–06 (see Exhibit 1), which was subsequently
modifi ed to a functional structure in 2006–07 (see Exhibit 2), as the organization
felt the need for increased coordination among its businesses.
It was envisaged that by the year 2007–08, the organization would be reorganized
into a structure that would resemble Exhibit 3, providing CKR and his top management
team with the much-needed time to focus on strategic initiatives.
T
HE BREWING ISSUE AND RESIGNATION
Though the enterprise was founded on the basis of the joint commitment and contribution
of CKR and his friends, it had been clearly communicated to everyone in the
organization that performance mattered. Though loyalty was valued, performance
was valued over loyalty. CKR himself led by example—he kept himself updated on the
business, and he was paid a salary that included a variable component, depending on
the business results and his contribution to the organization’s capacity-building.
As the organization grew and more professionals joined, the capacity of the initial
founding members became apparent, as they were able to deliver only to the extent
of their limited abilities. At that stage, it was necessary to either let them go, or to
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fi nd a suitable position in the organization, in line with their skills and competence
levels. For instance, the organization’s fi rst head of marketing, instrumental in the
‘fragrance revolution’ campaign, was made President of a subsidiary company, rather
than being retained in the main organizational structure.
Driving back home, images and incidents from the past twenty years fl ashed through
CKR’s mind, as he recalled the ups and downs of his entrepreneurial journey. He had
some lucky breaks, but in his heart he knew much of it had been about redeeming
himself—in his own eyes as well as that of his friends and family. The underdog syndrome
was evident in his case—he had come from humble beginnings, faced trials
and tribulations, used his gut and instincts to come out on top, and above all, faced
situations with unfl inching resolve and stayed true to his principles. Today he was
facing perhaps one of the classic challenges of entrepreneurs as they scaled up from
a family business to a professional organization—keep the friends who had kept faith
with him in his early days, or cut his losses and move on? He had acted responsibly
throughout, yet such righteousness was not always understood. The acceptance of
the resignation of his colleague had been yet another signifi cant decision, yet fraught
with complexities. His employees might perceive that he was dumping a trusted
lieutenant—an anathema in an Indian cultural context. What did it say about the
values of the organization and the notions of ‘success’? How could he explain this
without disturbing the morale of the employees? How best could he articulate the
management’s principles and goals? Should performance and professionalism be up
for debate at all?
Exhibit 1
CavinKare Organization Structure, 2005–06—SBU-based Structure
Source:
Company documents.
Notes:
CKR: C.K. Ranganathan; CMD: Chairman and Managing Director; EDCEO: Executive Director
and Chief Executive Offi cer; CEO: Chief Executive Offi cer; VP: Vice President; IB: International
Business; ED: Executive Director; Corp. Services: Corporate Services.
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Exhibit 2
CavinKare Organization Structure, 2006–07—Functional Structure
Source:
Company documents.
Notes:
CMD: Chairman and Managing Director; VP: Vice President; GM: General Manager; R&D: Research & Development;
Corp. HR: Corporate Human Resources; IT: Information Technology; IB: International Business.
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40 R. S
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Exhibit 3
CavinKare—Proposed Organization Structure, 2007–08
Source:
Company documents.
Notes:
CMD: Chairman and Managing Director; EA: Executive Assistant; ED: Executive Director; VP:
Vice President; GM: General Manager; CFO: Chief Financial Offi cer; F&A: Finance & Accounts;
IT: Information Technology; Mktg: Marketing; PC: Personal Care; IB: International Business;
Mfg: Manufacturing; QA: Quality Assurance; RM: Regional Manager; Corp. HR & Admn:
Corporate Human Resources and Administration; HR: Human Resources; Admn: Administration;
R&D: Research & Development.
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